> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://aomi.dev/docs/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Permission model > Understand how Aomi separates a model's proposal from the authority to sign and move value. Aomi treats a model's output as a proposal, never as authority. The model may compose a transaction and explain why it wants to run it. A separate, kernel-enforced policy decides whether that transaction may reach a signer. ## The security invariant **Composition is open. Signing is gated.** A prompt, App, or skill can request an action. None of them can grant themselves permission to sign. The wallet's policy remains authoritative across chat, scheduled work, and embedded surfaces. ```mermaid theme={null} flowchart LR A["Model or App proposes"] --> D{"Authorization gate"} B["Account and wallet identity"] --> D C["Wallet policy and signing capability"] --> D D -->|Authority is clear| E["Request a signature"] D -->|Missing or conflicting| F["Stop without a signature"] ``` ## Actors and trust boundaries | Actor | What it controls | What it cannot do | | ---------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | | **You** | Wallet connections, signing policy, approvals, and revocation | Change policy without proving control of an authorized wallet | | **Model** | The proposed intent and tool calls | Set its own signing mode or produce a wallet signature | | **App and skills** | The tools available to the model and any configured constraints | Override the wallet's policy | | **Aomi runtime** | Policy evaluation and routing to the permitted signing path | Use a self-custody key that remains in your wallet | | **Wallet or provider** | The cryptographic signature | Expand the transaction beyond what it is asked to sign | Your Aomi account owns threads, settings, Apps, and wallet-policy records. A linked wallet remains a distinct signing identity. Linking another wallet does not merge its funds, keys, or permissions with an existing wallet. ## Three independent controls Authorization depends on three separate questions. Passing one never implies that the others pass. ### Signing policy The signing policy answers **what kind of approval is required** for one linked wallet. It can require you to approve, permit an authorized signing path, or block signing entirely. A policy belongs to one wallet; linking another wallet does not copy it. This page defines the policy's role in the security model. Read [Configure approvals](/docs/security/configure-approvals) for the available settings and how to change them. ### Signing capability Policy is not the same as capability. A policy may permit an automatic signing path, but the required wallet session or provider authorization must also exist for the exact wallet. If it does not, Aomi stops instead of substituting another signer. ### Transaction constraints Signing permission does not make every transaction acceptable. Read [Transaction safety](/docs/security/transaction-safety) for simulation, App and skill constraints, protocol checks, batch integrity, and fail-closed behavior. ## How authorization is evaluated For each signing request, Aomi evaluates the current account, wallet, policy, and available signing capability. It uses current state rather than authority claimed by a prompt, old message, or schedule. Only after those relationships agree does Aomi hand the exact proposal to the transaction-safety pipeline. That pipeline owns constraint evaluation, simulation, signature verification, and broadcast. ## Non-custodial boundaries Aomi does not ask you to upload a private key. * A self-custody key remains in your wallet or approved client. * An embedded-wallet key remains with its wallet provider. * Delegated signing uses a revocable provider grant scoped to a wallet. * The runtime stores policy and grant state, not the private key material. Automatic signing is more powerful than a per-transaction prompt. Protect the account session and revoke the grant when unattended execution is no longer needed. ## The default is no signature If the account, wallet, policy, and signing capability do not resolve clearly, Aomi does not request a signature. It never widens authority or tries a different wallet to make the action succeed. Read [Transaction safety](/docs/security/transaction-safety) for the concrete checks and failure outcomes applied to a proposed transaction. ## What this model protects The permission model prevents a prompt, model, App, or skill from becoming its own source of signing authority. It also keeps authorization scoped to the specific account, wallet, chain family, policy version, and transaction path being evaluated. It does not make a protocol economically safe or make decisions for the wallet owner. [Transaction safety](/docs/security/transaction-safety#what-simulation-cannot-prove) lists the concrete risks outside Aomi's transaction checks. See what happens when a transaction needs a signature. Choose and change the policy for each wallet. Follow the checks that run before value moves.
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